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ABSTRACT: 
 
We present a wage-hours contract designed to minimize costly turnover given 
investments in specific training combined with firm and worker information 
asymmetries.  It may be optimal for the parties to work ‘long hours’ remunerated at 
premium rates for guaranteed overtime hours.  Based on British plant and machine 
operatives, we test three predictions.  First, trained workers with longer tenure are 
more likely to work overtime.  Second, hourly overtime pay exceeds the value of 
marginal product while the basic hourly wage is less than the value of marginal product. 
Third, the basic hourly wage is negatively related to the overtime premium.   
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1. Introduction 
Efficient long-term contracts must set hours of work as well as wages (Lazear, 
1981; Kahn and Lang, 1992).  For most workers, the wage rate and the number of hours 
are set such that the hourly wage is constant over all per period hours.  For an important 
sub-set of workers, however, marginal hours are remunerated at premium overtime 
rates.  What is the rationale for setting two rates – a basic rate and a premium rate – in 
terms of contract efficiency?  Extending a wage contract structure proposed by 
Carmichael (1983), designed to minimize costly turnover given sunk investments in 
specific capital as well as information asymmetries, Hart and Ma (2010) develop a wage-
hours contract explanation which recognises that it may be optimal for the bargaining 
parties to agree a contract designed to encourage long hours of work.  It establishes the 
need to pay a premium in excess of basic rates for overtime hours.  
Our wage-hours contract offers an alternative derivation of the negative wage-
premium trade-off established in earlier work.  The best known is the hedonic wage 
model of Lewis (1969).  It describes the ‘market equalising wage curve’ that reflects the 
preference of employees and employers who are brought together in equilibrium with 
labor demand equal to labor supply at all job (i.e. hours) lengths. In essence, the parties 
agree compensation packages based the worker’s objective of finding earnings/hours 
combinations that maximise utility coupled with the firm’s objective of profit 
maximisation (see Kinoshita, 1987; Trejo, 1991).   
After setting out the basic model, we undertake empirical work based on 
longitudinal panel data in respect of British blue-collar plant and machine operatives.  
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This is a relatively homogeneous occupational group in which the incidence of working 
paid overtime is high.  Unlike the United States, there is no regulation on the overtime 
premium in Britain. We explore three predicted outcomes from the wage-hours 
contract.  First, overtime firms have an incentive to guarantee an overtime premium for 
extra hours undertaken by trained workers with relatively long job tenure.  Second, 
contract efficiency dictates that the overtime premium is set such that hourly overtime 
pay exceeds the value of marginal product while the basic hourly wage is less than the 
value of marginal product.  Third, the wage-hours contract contains a compensating rule 
in which the basic contractual wage is negatively related to the overtime premium.   
 
2.  Overtime working and an efficient wage-hours contract 
We outline the essential features of our wage-hours contract model.  Full 
technical details can be found in Hart and Ma (2010).  Following a contract design 
originally proposed by Hashimoto (1981) and Carmichael (1983), the contract 
incorporates informational asymmetries between the bargaining parties.  There are 
transaction costs of verifying and communicating information in respect of the value of 
the marginal product (VMP) and the alternative hourly wage (wa).  We assume that the 
firm observes VMP and the worker observes wa . The firm and the marginal worker 
negotiate a job contract at the beginning of period 1 and there is no subsequent 
renegotiation.  The contract contains an agreed value of investment return.  For 
example, it may be simple to verify some of the elements that signal the level of 
productivity, such as the state of current and future orders for the firm’s product.  
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However, transaction costs preclude ex post agreement over the way in which random 
elements produce deviations from the agreed value (Hashimoto and Yu, 1980).   
The marginal worker’s pre-entry endowment of general human capital is worth 
wa in the spot market and this is not augmented within the firm.  Specific job training is 
undertaken at a fixed (i.e. hours-independent) weekly cost.  In period 1, the worker has 
hourly productivity VMP1 equal to wa minus the hourly training cost.  At the start of 
period 2 the worker is fully trained, with productivity VMP2, and no further training 
takes place.  First and second period hourly wages are denoted w1 and w2, respectively.  
Weekly hours in the firm are denoted by h and in alternative employment by ha.  Weekly 
earnings net of the disutility of providing weekly hours are expressed y = w.h – d(h). For 
simplicity, VMP2 is constant and invariant with respect to working hours.
1    
As a convenient starting point, suppose the firm and its workforce set fixed 
standard weekly hours based on custom and practice.  The resulting second-period 
weekly earnings are given by w2.h2.  The first-best separation rule is given by wa.ha - 
d(ha) > VMP2.h2 - d(h2).  However, the worker would quit if wa.ha - d(ha) > w2.h2 - d(h2) 
and the firm would layoff the worker if w2.h2 > VMP2.h2.  Due to asymmetric information 
combined with no permitted contract renegotiation, such quit/layoff rules allow the 
possibilities of inefficient separations. An inefficient quit would occur if  
 
( )           (  )         (  )         (  ) 
                                                     
1 The assumption that VMP2 declines in hours does not substantively change the main 
conclusions (Hart and Ma, 2010).  
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or the worker would quit the firm despite a positive (joint) surplus.  An inefficient layoff 
would occur if  
( )        (  )           (  )         (  )  
or the firm would fire the worker despite a positive (joint) surplus.  
What if the firm and its workforce agreed to move away from setting hours 
through custom and practice?  As long as a given worker’s return y2 = w2.h2 - d(h2) 
increases with h2 [i.e. w2 > d′(h2)], then longer hours increase the return and hence 
induce a greater incentive for the worker to stay. Assuming w2 > d′(h2), some marginal 
workers for whom wa.ha - d(ha) > w2.h2 - d(h2) held before the increase in h2 would now 
be induced to stay by a reversal of this inequality.  As for the firm, increasing h2 involves 
a cost (weekly earnings are increased) and a gain (weekly marginal product is increased).  
As long as VMP2.h2 ≥ w2.h2 the firm has no incentive to fire. In fact, given the assumption 
that VMP(h2) 0 , a change in h2 has no effect on layoffs.  Increases in h2 would occur up 
to the point where y2 = w2.h2 - d(h2) is maximized for the marginal worker subject to the 
constraint that w2.h2 ≤ VMP2.h2. Let the optimal hours for this worker be denoted ho.   
Operating under a (w2, ho) wage-hours contract does not rule out the possibility 
that VMP2 > w2, in which case the firm would prefer longer hours h2 > ho. This possibility 
is precluded in the contract as it stands because hours in excess of ho would reduce y2, 
or 
 
( )        (  )          (  )            
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implying that the probability that the worker quits is increased thereby increasing the 
likelihood of an inefficient separation.    
One possibility of compensating the fall of  y2 for a rise in h2 beyond ho, is for the 
firm to offer overtime pay k.w2 in respect of marginal hours such that w2.ho + k.w2.(h2 - 
ho) - d(h2) > w2.ho - d(ho). Using inequality (3), this implies that the overtime premium k 
would be set such that 
 
( )    
 (  )   (  )
   (     )
     
 
The firm pays an overtime premium k > 1 to compensate the worker for the disutility of 
‘involuntary’ long hours. 
The problem arises that the firm cannot pay all, equally productive, trained 
workers k2.w2 (k2 > 1). This would increase marginal pay and hence increase the 
probability of layoffs.  As things stand, the cost of retaining the marginal worker in 
period 2 is equal to the pay of a marginal worker.  However, greater contract efficiency 
can still be achieved using premium overtime pay via a solution equivalent to the wage 
contract proposed by Carmichael (1983).  This translates into creating junior and senior 
jobs for equally trained workers.  Junior workers work h0 hours at a single rate of w2 
while a fixed number of senior workers are guaranteed additional overtime hours at a 
premium rate, k.w2.  Eventually, as a senior worker retires or leaves the firm for other 
reasons, it becomes the turn of a junior worker to be offered the additional premium-
rated hours. Total employment is secured through a senior worker being replaced by a 
junior worker at cost w2.  The firm’s marginal hourly cost is k.w2 while the marginal 
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hourly replacement cost is w2.  Efficiency is achieved because the cost of retaining a 
marginal worker differs from the pay of a marginal worker.   
What is the incentive for workers to agree to such an arrangement?  It turns out 
that this overtime pay scheme has the automatic compensating rule  
( )               
that reduces both inefficient quits and inefficient layoffs (Hart and Ma, 2010).  The 
incentive is to receive a wage for marginal hours that exceeds the value of the marginal 
product.  Figure 1 illustrates the overtime pay schematic resulting from these 
developments.   
What is the relationship between the contractual wage and the overtime 
premium in our wage-hours contract?  There is an inverse relationship, or  
 
( )   
   
  
    
 
  
Lowering w2 increases profit to the firm but also increases the probability of the worker 
quitting. Hence the wage stopping rule is where the marginal profit to the firm equals to 
marginal loss of an extra unit reduction of w2.  Similarly, an increase of k reduces the 
profit to the firm but increases the probability of the worker staying, which in turn 
enhances the firm’s profit. Hence the premium stopping rule is where the marginal loss 
to the firm equals to marginal profit of an extra unit increase of k.  
In our empirical work, a potential complication to the foregoing theoretical 
discussion arises if the senior overtime job involves significantly different job tasks from 
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the junior job.  To the extent that specific capital derives from task-specific training (see 
Gibbons and Waldman 2004), such an internal job change would involve investment 
write-offs that would run against the rationale of the efficient contract structure.  As 
acknowledged by Carmichael (1983), the initial training programme would need to 
produce workers being equally capable of doing the junior and the senior job and, 
moreover, numbers of workers in junior and senior jobs would need to be set such that 
marginal product of a worker in each type of job is the same.  We tackle this issue 
empirically in two ways.  First, we concentrate on plant and machine operatives.  It is 
more likely that job promotions within this reasonably narrow range of associated blue 
collar job descriptions would involve quite major overlaps in job tasks thereby making 
initial training quite relevant to both junior and senior jobs.  Second, job tenure in our 
British individual longitudinal data is defined at 3-digit occupation level.  Where an 
internal job move involves a change in job tasks sufficient to warrant a new 3-digit 
heading then this marks the start of a new period of tenure.  Since we concentrate on 
job tenure only within single 3-digit occupations we rule out the problem of major 
changes in job descriptions and associated job tasks.  
 
3. Empirical Tests 
The foregoing model leads to three predictions concerning overtime working.  
First, paid overtime is undertaken by senior trained workers in the firm.  Second, 
overtime premium pay is greater than the value of marginal product which in turn is 
greater than the basic wage or k.w2 > VMP2 > w2.  Third, there is an inverse relationship 
between w2 and k. 
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Consistent with our first prediction, we would expect that the probability of 
working paid overtime to be positively related to the length of job tenure. For 
exposition, we concentrate on linear terms in tenure (TEN) and age (AGE).2  Tenure 
refers to job tenure defined as the period of time working within a single 3-digit 
occupation in a given firm.  
Let 
(7)       OVit = 1 if worker i at time t is working paid overtime 
             OVit = 0 otherwise. 
In order to accommodate the likely procyclicality of OVit, we include as an 
explanatory variable the annual change in the national unemployment rate to capture 
business fluctuations.  This requires us to tackle potential standard error biases 
associated with using an individual-level dependent variable alongside a national-level 
cyclical indicator.  To this end, we adopt the two-step estimation approach first 
proposed by Solon et al. (1994).   
Step 1 estimation is given by 
( )                              ∑     
 
   
         
where BARit is a dummy denoting an individual’s job is covered by collective bargaining, 
   is a year dummy, and Iit is a set of industry dummies.  From our theory, we expect  
                                                     
2 Our data set most suited for this estimation – the British New Earnings Survey Panel 
Data (NESPD) – do not allow the calculation of work experience and so we use the 
individual’s age in its place.  
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 ̂    .  We also expect  ̂    or contractual overtime is positively related to jobs in 
which collective bargaining takes place. 
Step 2 estimation is given by 
(9)   ̂                      
 
where ΔUt is first-differenced national claimant count unemployment and Yeart is a 
simple time trend.  In order to facilitate use of the two-step method, we estimate (9) as 
a linear probability model using weighted least squares where weights consist of the 
number of individuals observed in each year.  We expect  ̂    since the probability of 
working overtime rises towards cyclical peaks and declines near troughs.3   
In the case of the second prediction, that k.w > VMP > w2, we offer two tests. 
If, as our theory supports, overtime is remunerated under efficient contracts at a 
rate higher than VMP then we would expect lower job separation probabilities for this 
class of worker.  Given capital specificity, workers may find it difficult to obtain 
alternative employment that matches their marginal rates of pay.   
Let Sit denote a binary variable such that    
 (10)       Sit = 1 if worker i separates from his job at time t 
                Sit = 0 otherwise. 
Then, following the same empirical approach as before, we specify a linear probability 
model such that 
                                                     
3 We also estimated a probit model incorporating clustering for the unemployment 
variable.  This yielded marginal effects similar to our 2-step approach.   
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(  )                               ∑     
 
   
         
where OVit-1 = 1 if the worker worked overtime in the previous period.  Note that TENit = 
0 at points of separation.  We expect  ̂      given younger workers display more job 
mobility than older workers (e.g. Macaulay, 2003).  As discussed above, we expect  
 ̂    .  We also expect that  ̂    or there is a reduced probability of separation in 
jobs covered by collective bargaining. 
Step 2 estimation is given by 
(12)  ̂                      
where we expect  ̂     or separations are procyclical. 
4    
The difficulty with formulating a more direct test of the inequalities in (5) – viz. 
              is that we require measures of individual productivities.  Such 
variables are not available in our British data sources.  However, a modelling approach 
introduced by Kahn and Lang (1992) - who test for the relative strengths of agency 
versus human capital theories in predicting long term associations between the wage 
and VMP - gives us a way to proceed.    
 Assuming job tenure captures the accumulated productive returns on-the-job, 
after controlling for general labor market work experience, three relationships are of 
interest. 
                                                     
4 Again, a probit allowing for marginal effects and clustering in respect of 
unemployment produced similar outcomes.  
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(  )                           
 
 
(  )                              
 
(  )   (   )                       
 
 
where Z is a set of controls and where we expect, given (5), that  1 <   2 <  3 (see Figure 
1).5 
The probability that desired hours exceed contact hours is the probability that 
the hourly wage (standard or overtime) exceeds VMP.  This is expressed 
 
 
(  )    [                            ]    
 
   [(      )              (   )  ]          
 
 
If OV = 1 then k.w > VMP and workers will desire more hours.  If OV = 0, w < VMP and 
less hours would be desired.  Using (13), (14) and (15), we can re-write equation (16) as 
 
(  )    [                            ]    
 
   [   (     )          (     )  (     )       (     )          
 (      )                    ]  
 
                                                     
5 Equations (13) - (15) are estimated using the British Household Panel Dataset (BHPS) 
since, unlike the NESPD, this data source provides information on workers’ desired 
hours (see the Appendix for discussion).  It also allows us to measure work experience 
(EXP) – given by the number of years in the workforce since the end of full-time 
education - and this replaces AGE in the relevant regressions. 
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Providing that the error terms are normally distributed, then (17) can be 
estimated as a bivariate probit equation.  Our theory predicts that (i) the coefficient on 
tenure should be negative, (ii) the coefficient on OV.TEN should be positive, and (iii) the 
sum of these coefficients should be positive. Finally, (Γ1 – Γ2) and (Γ3 – Γ1) can be any sign 
for Z and for OV.Z, respectively. 
However, there is a problem with estimating (17) as a simple probit.  From Table 
1, we find that over half of respondents in our BHPS sample report that they are 
satisfied with their actual hours.  This same problem is found by Kahn and Lang (1992) in 
their work on agency versus specific capital.  They suggest two model modifications to 
accommodate the problem.  Equivalent lines of reasoning apply here.   
The first modification is to assume that respondents report an inequality 
between actual and desired hours only if the deviations are nontrivial.  Then we can 
define a dummy taking the value 1 for a sufficiently large positive deviation, -1 for a 
sufficiently large negative deviation, and 0 for deviations that do not trigger either of 
these responses.  Then equation (17) can be estimated as an ordered probit.  
The second modification concerns the fact that the overtime model outlined 
here is most relevant to long-term employment relationships that incorporate the 
objective of minimising quits and layoffs given potential losses of returns to specific 
capital investments.  In effect, our model treats overtime as a guaranteed payment. But 
we know that paid overtime arises for a range of other, often more ad hoc and short-
term, reasons. The firm may employ overtime hours to meet rush orders, to fill the gap 
of a temporary shortfall of labor given unanticipated rises in product demand, to 
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provide cover for absenteeism, and so on.  So the inequality arising from the structural 
assumptions behind equation (17) might reasonably be taken to be conditional on an 
expected long-term employer-worker relationship.  A simple bivariate probit is then 
interpreted as capturing workers who are constrained in this way.  
We might also expect that longer term contractual hours arrangements are more 
likely to apply to experienced, prime-age, workers.  For many workers, job shopping in 
early years in the labor market will result in improved job matches that eventually give 
the parties more confidence in investing in longer term relationships.  Older workers 
who, for whatever reason, have changed jobs may be less likely to receive significant 
new job opportunities given shorter expected time horizons in which to amortize 
investment outlays in training.  Accordingly, we carry out estimation both with respect 
to all plant and machine operatives and those aged between 25 to 45 years. Age 
distributions of plant and machine operatives over the period 1991-2011 are shown in 
Figure 2, covering all workers as well the sub-set working overtime.  The two 
distributions are almost identical.  Of all observations, 55% are within the 25-45 age 
range.   
The last prediction from the theory is that ∂k/∂w < 0, or the overtime premium 
and the hourly standard wage are inversely related.  The NESPD provides data on total 
weekly hours (H), standard weekly hours (HS), weekly overtime hours HP (= H - HS) as 
well as hourly earnings including overtime (e) and the standard hourly wage (w).  Then, 
for each worker, the average overtime premium, p, is given by 
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(  )       
(
   
   
)        
    
    
 
where pit > 0 if           , and pit = 0 if          . 
We investigate the wage-premium trade-off via the wage equation 
 
(  )                                                 
 
where logwit is the log of the real basic wage rate (excluding overtime) and where Zit are 
controls consisting of time and industry dummies.  We expect  ̂     from the theory.   
We estimate (19) by OLS as well as by controlling for individual fixed effects.   
 
4. Data 
Our estimation is carried out using data on British plant and machine operatives 
reported in the NESPD (British New Earnings Survey Panel Data) and the BHPS (British 
Household Panel Dataset).  These consist of a relatively homogeneous group of blue-
collar occupations.6  Britain’s best statistical source for pay and hours is the company-
based NESPD.  We make use of this data set from 1991 to 2011.  However, the NESPD 
does not ask questions concerning individuals’ desired working time and so we use the 
household-based BHPS in this respect. These data are available from 1991 to 2008. The 
comparative advantage of NESPD is its large sample coverage and accuracy.  It is based 
                                                     
6 The NESPD’s coverage of plant and machine operatives embraces over sixty-two 3-digit 
occupations.  These are grouped by process operatives (food drink and tobacco; textile 
and tannery; chemicals, paper, plastics and related; metal making and treating; metal 
working; other routine) and by other work (assemblers/lineworkers; road transport; 
other transport and machinery; plant and machine).  
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on company payroll records and, unlike the BHPS, it does not rely on self reporting. The 
comparative advantage of the BHPS is that it allows for a wider set of controls, including 
household and educational background.  For both our data sets, Table 1 shows that over 
half of individuals/households covered by our plant and machine operators’ samples 
report working paid overtime.   
The complete NESPD is comprised of a random sample of 1% of the entire British 
workforce.  Employers complete a questionnaire, based on their payrolls, that relates to a 
specific week in April. Since the same individuals are in the sample each year, the NESPD is 
a panel data set.  Completing the survey questionnaire is a legal requirement and so the 
response rate is very high.  Since the data are taken directly from the employer's payroll 
records, the earnings and hours information in the NESPD are considered to be very 
accurate.  A question in the Survey allows us to identify job movers and so we can 
accurately measure spell lengths of 3-digit level jobs.   
The BHPS is an annual survey consisting of a nationally representative sample of 
about 5,500 households recruited in 1991 and containing a total of approximately 
10,000 interviewed individuals in Great Britain. In 1999, additional samples were added 
consisting of 1,500 households in each of England and Wales. The sample is a stratified 
clustered design drawn from the Postcode Address File and all residents present at 
those addresses at the first wave of the survey were designated as panel members. 
These same individuals are re-interviewed each successive year and, if they split-off 
from original households to form new households, they are followed and all adult 
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members of these households are also interviewed. Similarly, new members joining 
sample households become eligible for interview.  
One downside of the BHPS data should be mentioned. In contrast to the NESPD, 
tenure in the BHPS refers to length of stay in the firm rather than stay within given 
occupations in the firm.  This is clear when comparing lengths of tenure in the two data 
sets reported in Table 1.7  So changes in tenure in the BHPS may involve job promotions 
that are not accommodated by the assumptions behind our efficient contract design. 
From Table 1 we find that standard weekly hours of plant and machine 
operatives are comparable in the data sets, averaging about 40 hours per week.  
Overtime hours of plant and machine operatives are high, averaging around 10/11 
weekly hours for those working overtime and around 5/6 hours over all operatives.  
Average real weekly earnings in the NESPD and BHPS, including overtime pay, compare 
closely.  The average overtime premium is 1.4 in both surveys.8   
 
 
 
                                                     
7 Even given the distinction between job tenure and employer tenure, the differences in 
average tenure lengths – about 2.8 years in the NESPD compared with 5.5 years in the 
BHPS – appear too large. This arises because interviewees in the BHPS are asked when 
they started with the current firm and this is recorded as the tenure starting point even 
if they are first recorded at a later stage.  No such retrospective question is asked in the 
NESPD and this accentuates the tenure gaps between the two panel surveys.   
 
8 Note that this is an average across weekly overtime hours of the individual.  The 
marginal rate may be higher.  For example, some individuals may work during weekends 
or holiday periods at higher premium rates.  There is quite strong British evidence, 
however, that the overtime premium does not vary by length of overtime hours (Bell 
and Hart, 2003).  
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6 Results 
Within 3-digit level jobs, we obtain evidence in Table 2 in support of the 
prediction that the probability of working paid overtime increases with job tenure.  In 
Section 2, we argue that the NESPD jobs-based data provide a strong test of the 
proposed contract model because we can control against more senior workers 
undertaking more overtime due to major changes in job descriptions within the firm.  
We note also from Table 2 that the probability of undertaking paid overtime, controlling 
for job tenure, rises in age.  Figure 2 shows that the incidence of overtime working peaks 
among individuals in their middle 20s to middle 40s.  We find that the probability of 
overtime working is positively related to jobs in which collective bargaining takes place, 
a result compatible with our wage-hours contract formulation.  Finally, and 
unsurprisingly, the probability of working overtime is found to be strongly procyclical.  
Our model provides an incentive to work long hours by paying hourly contract 
wages for all trained workers below marginal product and hourly overtime pay for 
longer tenured workers above marginal product.  Under such an incentive structure we 
would expect that this would serve to reduce the probability of job separation among 
overtime workers.  This expected outcome is supported by our results in Table 3.  The 
probability of separations in a given time period is significantly lower among workers 
who worked overtime in the previous period.  Age is also negatively related to job 
separations, which is a well known result in the literature.  Younger workers generally 
display more job mobility than older workers (e.g. Macaulay, 2003).  Job separations are 
found to be less likely to feature in jobs that are subject to collective bargaining 
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agreements, a result plausibly linked to an implied great security of employment.  At 
best, we find that the probability of job separations among plant and machine 
operatives is weakly procyclical.  
Table 4 contains the BHPS estimates that are designed to test if our modelling 
outcomes are consistent with the overtime schematic portrayed in Figure 1, with k.w2 > 
VMP2 > w2.  As discussed earlier, we show estimates based on both ordered and simple 
probits.  If these inequalities hold then the prediction is, via equation (17), that the 
probability desired hours exceed actual hours should correlate (i) negatively with 
tenure, (ii) positively with tenure interacted with working overtime, and (iii) positively 
over the sum of these two effects.  We argue in Section 3 that there is reason to test the 
underlying empirical model in respect of all operatives (aged 16 to 65) and prime age 
operatives (25-45).  All three predicted signs hold for both age ranges.  However, 
statistically, the restriction in (iii) is supported by a Wald test only in respect of the 
narrower age sample.   
We plotted the average real hourly wage rates (excluding overtime) associated 
with estimated average premiums rising in steps of 0.05 in the range 1.0 to 2.0.  
Outcomes in respect of all operatives are shown in Figure 3.  For most of the range the 
relationship is strongly negative.  Only at very high average premiums – in excess of 1.55 
– does the relationship cease to hold.   Only 11.7 % of overtime workers receive an 
average premium higher than 1.55.  In line with this evidence, our wage regression 
estimates of equations (19), shown in Table 5, support a significantly negative wage-
premium relationship.  While individual fixed effects coefficient estimates are somewhat 
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smaller than their OLS equivalents, the estimation methods provide reasonably 
comparable outcomes.   
 
7 Conclusion 
Given specific training investment combined with information asymmetries, we 
view premium-paid overtime working as providing a means of the firm and its workers 
achieving mutual benefits from working long hours.  Where work schedules beyond the 
standard workday are considered to be potentially profitable, then paying for overtime 
hours above marginal product to senior trained workers and standard hours below 
marginal product to all trained workers provides a more efficient contractual outcome 
than the payment of a single hourly wage rate.  Despite other motives for working paid 
overtime, such as to meet short-term unforeseen bottlenecks, our proposed model 
gains support from evidence based on British plant and machine operatives.   
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Appendix: Desired and actual hours in the BHPS 
The key question asked in the BHPS is: "Thinking about the hours you work, and 
assuming that you would be paid the same amount per hour, would you prefer to (a) 
work fewer hours, (b) work more hours, (c) continue with the same hours." 9  How does 
this question link to our analysis? For a respondent who works no overtime and is 
remunerated at the basic hourly rate, the interpretation of the question is 
unambiguous.  Consider the response of an overtime worker.  In this case, the question 
arises as to whether the respondent treats the marginal wage as the basic wage or the 
overtime wage (i.e. the basic rate times the overtime premium). Two possibilities arise.  
First, an overtime worker regards a desired increase/decrease in hours in terms of a 
change in overtime hours.  This is likely to be the case because basic hours are generally 
stipulated in British wage contracts to constitute the first hours worked during the 
working day or week.  If overtime is scheduled then overtime hours follow on from the 
agreed number of basic hours.  It follows in this case that an overtime worker would 
perceive that changing hours at the margin means changing overtime hours.  Second, a 
less likely response among overtime workers may occur if the BHPS question was 
interpreted as referring to basic hours in relation to basic wage rates. They may then 
indicate that they would prefer to work fewer basic hours while regarding their 
overtime hours as unchanged. Thus the BHPS question may result in an under-
estimation of a positive hours’ response. 
                                                     
9 Additionally, the survey records 'inapplicable', 'proxy respondent' and 'don't know' 
responses, which we ignore. 
 
 24 
 
  
 
VMP1
VMP2
w2
k.w2
1
Hourly rate of pay
2
Figure 1  Second-period hourly pay profile
Time
 25 
Figure 2 Age distribution of plant and machinery observations: 1991-2011 (NESPD) 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Real basic hourly wages and the overtime premium: plant and machine 
operatives aged 16-65, 1991-2011 (NESPD) 
 
 
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64
A
ge
 p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
s 
o
f 
to
ta
l 
All Doing overtime
3.6
3.8
4
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
5
1 1.05 1.1 1.15 1.2 1.25 1.3 1.35 1.4 1.45 1.5 1.55 2
R
ea
l h
o
u
rl
y 
ea
rn
in
gs
 e
xc
lu
d
in
g 
o
ve
rt
im
e
 
Premium 
 26 
Table 1  Background statistics: plant and machine operatives, NESPD (1991-2011) and 
                 BHPS (1991-2008) 
 
 Operatives aged 16-65 Operatives aged 25-45 
 NESPD BHPS BHPS 
Percentage working paid overtime 
 
54.3 53.1 54.8 
Standard weekly hours of 
overtime workers 
 
39.4 40.3 40.7 
Standard weekly hours of all 
workers 
 
39.4 40.4 41.0 
Average weekly paid overtime 
hours of overtime workers 
 
9.5 10.7 11.1 
Average weekly paid overtime 
hours of all workers 
 
5.2 5.7 6.1 
Average years of job tenure 
(NESPD)/employer tenure (BHPS) 
of overtime workers  
 
2.8 5.4 4.1 
Average years of job tenure 
(NESPD)/employer tenure (BHPS) 
of all workers  
 
2.8 5.5 4.4 
Average real weekly earnings of 
overtime workers (£’s) 
 
222.3 212.3 222.3 
Average real weekly earnings of all 
workers (£’s) 
 
203.5 200.9 211.6 
Average overtime premium 
 
1.4 1.4 1.4 
Proportion of total males whose 
desired hours > actual hours 
 
- 6.7 7.0 
Proportion of total males whose 
desired hours = actual hours 
 
- 56.5 56.2 
Proportion of total males whose 
desired hours < actual hours 
 
- 36.8 36.8 
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Table 2  OLS estimates of working paid overtime: plant and machine operatives, 
                 NESPD, 1991-2011  
 
 Step1 estimates 
TENURE 0.0062** 
(0.0011) 
 
TENURE2/100 -0.0447** 
(0.0073) 
 
AGE 
 
0.0145** 
(0.0010) 
 
AGE2/100 
 
-0.0170** 
(0.0013) 
 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
0.0099* 
(0.0050) 
 
Industry and year dummies Yes 
 
Sample size 74,213 
 
 Step 2 estimate 
Δ (UNEMPLOYMENT) -0.0161** 
(0.0042) 
Constant and time trend 
 
Yes 
Sample size 21  
  
Notes: Sample: male plant and machine operatives aged 16 to 65.  Bracketed figures are 
standard errors and ** (*) denotes 1% (5%) significance.   
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Table 3  OLS estimates of job separations: plant and machine operatives,   
                 NESPD, 1991-2011 
 
 Step1 estimates 
WORKED PAID OVERTIME IN PREVIOUS PERIOD 
 
-0.0137** 
(0.0025) 
 
AGE 
 
-0.0088** 
(0.0008) 
 
AGE2/100 
 
0.0073** 
(0.0009) 
 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
-0.0065 
(0.0034) 
 
Industry and year dummies Yes 
 
Sample size 
 
51,844 
 Step 2 estimate 
Δ (UNEMPLOYMENT) (all separations) 
 
-0.0051 
(0.0044) 
 
Constant and time trend 
 
Yes 
Sample size 21 
 
Notes: Sample: male plant and machine operatives aged 16 to 65.  Bracketed figures are 
standard errors and ** (*) denotes 1% (5%) significance.   
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Table 4  Ordered probit and probit estimates of wanting more versus less hours at the 
                same hourly wage rate: plant and machine operatives, BHPS, 1991-2008 
 
 Operatives aged 16-65 Operatives aged 25-45 
 Ordered More versus 
Less 
Ordered More versus 
Less 
TEN -0.0100** 
(0.0037) 
-0.0242** 
(0.0082) 
 
-0.0186** 
(0.0062) 
-0.0426** 
(0.0146) 
OV.TEN 0.0104* 
(0.0047) 
0.0318** 
(0.0105) 
 
0.0297** 
(0.0083) 
0.0667** 
(0.0183) 
EXP -0.0310** 
(0.0058) 
-0.0408** 
(0.0120) 
 
-0.0178 
(0.0202) 
0.0082 
(0.0413) 
(EXP)2/10 0.0049** 
(0.0011) 
0.0054* 
(0.0025) 
 
0.0035 
(0.0057) 
-0.0045 
(0.0116) 
OV.EXP -0.0209* 
(0.0043) 
-0.0344** 
(0.0089) 
 
-0.0175 
(0.0107) 
-0.0263 
(0.0220) 
(OV.EXP)2/10 0.0038** 
(0.0011) 
0.0045 
(0.0025) 
 
0.0008 
(0.0045) 
-0.0016 
(0.0093) 
[more hours]Ten + [more 
hours]OV.Ten = 0  
Prob > chi2 
0.89 0.27 0.05 0.04 
Sample size 
 
6,260 2,725 2,709 1,232 
Notes: Bracketed figures are standard errors and ** (*) denotes 1% (5%) significance.  OV is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if a worker is working paid overtime, otherwise zero.  
Additional controls in the BHPS regressions are (i) levels of pre-work education (five levels 
from university degree to legal minimum years of schooling), (ii) a dummy denoting whether 
cohabiting with partner, (iii) dummy denoting whether divorced, (iv) the age of youngest 
dependent child, and (v) year fixed effects. 
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Table 5 Estimates of wage – premium relationship: plant and machine operatives, NESPD, 
1991-2011  
 
 OLS Individual fixed 
effects 
 
AVERAGE PREMIUM 
 
-0.0290** 
(0.0011) 
 
-0.0166** 
(0.0007) 
 
TENURE 0.0270** 
(0.0007) 
 
0.0164** 
(0.0005) 
 
TENURE2/100 -0.0950** 
(0.0045) 
 
-0.0626** 
(0.0034) 
 
AGE 
 
0.0470** 
(0.0006) 
 
0.0440** 
(0.0006) 
 
AGE2/100 
 
-0.0545** 
(0.0008) 
 
-0.0488** 
(0.0008) 
 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
0.1022** 
(0.0031) 
 
0.0323** 
(0.0024) 
 
Year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Industry dummies 
 
Yes - 
Sample size 74,198 
 
74,198 
 
Notes:  Dependent variable is log (real basic hourly wage rate). Sample: male plant and 
machine operatives aged 16 to 65.  Bracketed figures are standard errors and ** (*) denotes 
1% (5%) significance.   
 
 
